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Introduction 
William D. Spaulding 
University of Nebraska-Lincoln 
One of my formative experiences as a graduate student came during 
a break in our afternoon-long first-year proseminar. We had been 
discussing the scope of psychology, or rather, listening to two pro- 
fessors debate the scope of psychology. Both the protagonists were 
clinical psychologists by training, but one had remained an empiri- 
cally focused social learning theorist, while the other had pursued 
the study of Eastern religion, psychoanalysis, and transpersonal 
psychology. As the class milled about, the social learning empiricist 
sought some closure on the discussion. "Dick," he said to his trans- 
personal colleague, "it seems to me that we disagree because in your 
view, what I do isn't psychology, and in my view, what you do isn't 
science ." 
We tend to think of the preparadigmatic era of science as charac- 
terized by instability and ambiguity in the nature of explanatory 
paradigms. As that break revealed, however, we often seem to be as 
confused about what we are attempting to understand as how we 
should understand it. 
Today many believe that over the past decade or so psychology 
has become a paradigmatic science (Baars, 1986). The new paradigm 
is an understanding of behavior in terms of cognitive representa- 
tions, "the computational metaphor," and a view of biological or- 
X 
INTEGRATIVE VIEWS OF MOTIVATION, COGNITION, AND EMOTION 
ganisms as heterarchically organized information-processing sys- 
tems interacting with environmental exigencies. If psychology now 
has a paradigm, we might expect that the explanatory scope of psy- 
chology will be clarified by that paradigm. We might further expect 
that this clarification will come as new conceptualizations of ideas 
that have evolved over the hundred or so years of psychology's 
modern era. 
Motivation, emotion, and cognition have all been superordinate 
ideas in psychology. Motivation refers to the meaning and purpose 
of behavior. Emotion refers to experiential and psychophysiological 
phenomena that accompany motivational processes. Cognition re- 
fers to organismic activity, not directly observable, which translates 
motivation and emotion into observable behavior. Psychological 
theory has traditionally attempted to explain events in one of these 
domains in terms of events in the other ones. Different theories have 
postulated different causal directions and relations between the do- 
mains. For example, specific motivational processes are hypothe- 
sized to give rise to specific emotional, cognitive, and behavioral 
events. The diversity of theories and lack of consensus about which 
ones have explanatory superiority are precisely the type of confu- 
sion to be expected in a preparadigmatic science. Similarly, lack of 
consensus about which processes in which domains constitute 
"psychology" illustrates the effect of a poorly defined explanatory 
scope. The benefits of a psychological paradigm should include a 
new, unified, and integrated understanding of the relationships be- 
tween motivation, cognition, and emotion. 
The cognitive revolution in psychology has fostered a particular 
view of cognition as the passing of information back and forth be- 
tween perceptual, memory, and motor components of an integrated 
system. Can this view be systematically extended to phenomena 
that have traditionally fallen under the rubrics of motivation and 
emotion? This volume of the Nebraska Symposium on Motivation is 
a collection of views that address that question. Most generally, the 
contributions taken together stimulate a hypothesis that the cogni- 
tive paradigm has began to move psychology toward a "unified field 
theory" of behavior and experience. 
The first contribution in this volume, by Herbert Simon, tests 
the limits of a pure information-processing paradigm. It is a basic 
tenet of information theory that information exists independent of 
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the medium by which it is represented. By analyzing the informa- 
tion-processing capabilities of nonbiological systems, or "artificial 
intelligence," we may perhaps determine what aspects of motiva- 
tion and emotion require consideration of the biological substrate of 
cognition and which do not. The second contribution, by Muriel 
Lezak, raises the same sort of question by focusing on the biological 
substrate itself and analyzing constraints and determinations that it 
imposes. The third contribution, by Howard Gardner, considers in 
tandem the medium and the information it processes and lays a con- 
ceptual foundation for making the facts of biological brain science 
congruent with the richness and diversity of human behavior and 
experience. The fourth contribution, by Johq Bargh and Peter Goll- 
witzer, elaborates on constructs that potentially incorporate key as- 
pects of human functioning, such as social behavior and creativity, 
into a comprehensive, integrated, and cognitive view of motivation. 
The final two contributions take the discussion out of purely 
theoretical context to address issues in clinical application. Psycho- 
pathology and the psychology of adjustment have traditionally pro- 
vided a conceptual compass to theoretical psychology. We may learn 
about normal processes by studying the abnormal. This applies to 
abnormalities in the information-processing substrate, as Lezak's 
chapter so clearly illustrates, and to problems in the informational 
processes that are independent of the substrate. The fifth contribu- 
tion to this volume, by Nancy Cantor and William Fleeson, de- 
scribes an integrated cognitive theoretical perspective, which is 
potentially useful for understanding, among other things, the differ- 
ences between effective and ineffective social functioning. The sixth 
contribution, by Don Fowles, presents a theoretical framework for 
understanding a diversity of severe psychopathology in terms com- 
patible with an integrated cognitive, motivational, and emotional 
understanding of normal behavior. 
Posters were invited for presentation at the symposium in Lin- 
coln in October 1992. They represent diverse work on integrative 
views of motivation, cognition, and emotion. Abstracts of the poster 
presentations are included at the end of this volume. 
Grateful acknowledgment is made to series editor Richard 
Dienstbier and the Nebraska Symposium on Motivation editorial 
committee, for their sponsorship and support. Additional thanks 
are extended to the contributors, who responded with diligence and 
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alacrity to the demands of producing this volume, and to the poster 
session authors. Most important, special thanks are due to the fac- 
ulty and students of the University of Nebraska-Lincoln Depart- 
ment of Psychology, whose scholarly energy inspired this volume 
and gave it its direction and focus. 
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